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Abstract
Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a
widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally
necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for
this belief which I call ‘reasons-based accounts’ (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of
extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several
alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Keywords: Free will; libertarianism; folk intuitions; phenomenology

One important component for libertarian views of free will is that the choices of free agents are
not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. Recent research suggests that, regardless of the
truth of libertarianism, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons
that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs (Nichols and
Knobe 2007; Nichols 2012; Deery, Bedke, and Nichols 2013; Nadelhoffer et al. 2014). In response
to this research, philosophers have sought to explain why this belief should be so prevalent
(Holton 2009; Nichols 2015). They have largely provided debunking explanations—accounts that
explain the existence of a widespread belief in indeterminist choice but that also hold that this
widespread belief does not justify accepting libertarian views of free will. In this paper, I propose a
new class of debunking explanations for this indeterministic belief which I call reasons-based
accounts (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to
debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives,
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.

1. Failures of the Spinozan strategy
The most popular debunking explanation relies on what I call the ‘Spinozan strategy.’ According
to the Spinozan strategy, the folk belief in the indeterminacy of choice is inferred from
introspection on the phenomenology of first-person agency.1 More specifically, Spinozan
strategists hold that the introspectively available agentive experience of choosing has the
following feature:

1
For ease of exposition, I use the terms ‘indeterministic,’ ‘not causally necessitated,’ and ‘not causally determined’
interchangeably in this paper, while acknowledging that in many crucial cases these concepts come apart (Kissel 2018).
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1. Experience does not present one’s behavior as causally necessitated.2
Thus, when we attend to the experience of first-person agency, we do not find causal necessitation as
part of its phenomenological contents. There is a subtle distinction between this feature of the
phenomenology of first-person agency and the following feature:
2. Experience presents one’s behavior as not causally necessitated.
The Spinozan strategy holds that (1) is a prominent feature of the phenomenology of first-person
agency while (2) is not. Supporters of the strategy argue that it is not even clear what it could be like
to experience one’s behavior as not causally necessitated (Holton 2009 168). Nevertheless, in some
cases, the absence of evidence can provide evidence of absence, provided one has appropriate
background assumptions.3 On the assumption that if my behavior was causally necessitated, then
causal necessitation would be a feature of my phenomenology, I could justifiably infer that my
choices are not causally necessitated on the basis of (1). For this reason, Spinozan strategists have
argued that we assume we have complete access to the influences on our choices such that the
absence of evidence of causal necessitation becomes evidence of absence (Nichols 2015).
The main worry for the Spinozan strategy is that, if we hold such a background assumption in the
case of choices, it is hard to see why we wouldn’t hold it in other cases as well. As such, the strategy is
liable to overgeneralize. Consider the following analogue to (1).
1.* Experience does not present the phenomena as causally necessitated.
I submit that (1*) is a common feature of experience in a good number of cases. Suppose that I see a
thrown ball land in a potted plant, followed immediately by the lights in the room turning off. My
visual experience presents the events in quick succession but does not present them as causally
connected (Siegel 2009, 526). In this case, my visual experience does not present the lights turning
off as causally necessitated by the throw of the ball. Contrast this with the following subtly different
feature:
2.* Experience presents the phenomena as not causally necessitated.
The Spinozan strategy seems to predict that people will infer that the turning off of the lights was
indeterministic. But this is clearly absurd. Despite the apparent widespread occurrence of (1*) and
the lack of (2*), it seems highly unlikely that people would regularly believe that the turning off
of the light was indeterministic on the basis of introspective attention to visual experiences like that
of the ball, the potted plant, and the lights turning off.
It may be pointed out that we don’t infer indeterminism in the potted plant case because we
already assume that lights only turn on or off when something causes them to turn on or off.
Inferring indeterminism would go against previously held background causal assumptions, so we
assume there must be a hidden cause of which we are unaware. But this fails to respond to the
overgeneralization worry, as it is unclear why we would have background causal assumptions in
other cases, but not when introspecting first-person agentive phenomenology of choice, unless we
already assume that choices are not causally necessitated.4

2

This formulation of the Spinozan strategy borrows from Terry Horgan (2012).
In this context, background assumptions are implicit beliefs that rationalize the debunking inference and not components of
the experience of choice. Thank you to an anonymous reader for pushing for clarification on this point.
4
Despite the overgeneralization worry, the Spinozan strategy is at the same time surprisingly narrow in its scope. The
Spinozan strategy is presented in the context of a debunking explanation for why aspects of first-person agentive
3

https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.18 Published online by Cambridge University Press

590

Andrew Kissel

The above discussion suggests that, in order to avoid overgeneralization, the account should
explain why indeterministic beliefs tend to arise only in the case of choices. Spinozan strategists
have tended to implicitly adopt the following conditions of adequacy.
A. No Overgeneralization: Explanations of folk beliefs ought not to overgeneralize.
Contemporary Spinozan strategists additionally accept two further conditions of adequacy:
B. Reasonableness: All else being equal, to the extent an explanation of folk belief avoids the
attribution of obviously unreasonable inferences, it is to be preferred over those that attribute
less reasonable inferences, and
C. Scientific Plausibility: One’s explanations of folk beliefs should be plausible in light of our best
extant science.
These conditions tend to pull in different directions such that even the best versions of the Spinozan
strategy have fallen short of satisfying all three.
The Spinozan strategist makes empirical claims about widespread beliefs. As such, it is not entirely
surprising that they should hold that, all else being equal, the explanation of the belief in indeterministic choice ought to be psychologically plausible (Searle 2003; Dennett 1984, 15; Nichols 2015,
49). For this reason, Scientific Plausibility has been a driving constraint on the Spinozan strategy.
The Reasonableness constraint holds that, all else being equal, we should prefer explanations of
folk belief that avoid characterizing a belief’s source as obviously unreasonable (Dennett 1984, ch. 1;
Nichols 2015, 48; Holton 2009, 171). Again, this constraint is not entirely surprising. A minimal
principle of charity suggests that we should try to interpret those who believe that choice is not
causally necessitated in a positive light. Furthermore, the belief that choices are not causally
necessitated appears widespread and apparently cross-culturally robust (Sarkissian et al. 2010).
Were the belief obviously unreasonable, we would not expect it to be so widespread across the globe
and throughout history. Finally, the belief appears particularly entrenched in the sense that it is
resistant to revision in the face of reflection. This entrenchment appears easier to explain on the
assumption that the inference that supports it is not obviously unreasonable. For these reasons,
Reasonableness has seemed an appropriate constraint to adopt by most Spinozan strategists.
The difficulty for the Spinozan strategist is to provide an explanation that avoids overgeneralization, while also making the belief appear not obviously unreasonable in a way that is consistent
with extant science. One example defense, there is some scientific evidence that individuals subject
to an “illusion of explanatory depth” (IOED) mistakenly assume they have a greater understanding
of the causal influences in a mechanism than they actually have (Kozuch and Nichols 2011). If a
person were subject to an IOED in the case of choices, then they could have an inflated sense of their
own reflective access to the causal influences on their choices, in which case, the fact that the
accessible proximal causal influences on their choice do not appear to necessitate the choice
supports the belief that the choice is not causally necessitated at all (Nichols 2015, ch. 2). If
successful, the approach would appear to satisfy all three constraints.

phenomenology are interpreted as having libertarian satisfaction conditions. Yet the Spinozan strategy only accounts for beliefs
resulting from one aspect of first-person agentive phenomenology: the lack of causal necessitation. While the Spinozan strategy
may explain the belief that behavior is not causally necessitated on the basis of first-person introspection, it remains silent on
other aspects of freedom usually attributed to first-person agentive phenomenology. These other aspects include (but are not
limited to) the sense that choices are “up-to-me,” the sense that I am a source of my choice, the sense that I could have done
otherwise (all other facts about me held constant), etc. (Nadelhoffer et al. 2014; Horgan 2011b) By not addressing these other
aspects of first-person agentive phenomenology, the Spinozan strategy provides, in principle, only a partial debunking of
apparently widespread beliefs.
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Unfortunately, the approach fails. IOEDs that occur in the case of choices are too similar to
those in other domains such that they do not block overgeneralization. A stronger IOED in the
case of choices could block overgeneralization but is not currently plausible in light of extant
science. But the largest concern for this approach lies in the IOEDs themselves. IOEDs occur in
cases where we believe the object in question is a causally closed, deterministic system, such as
locks, bicycles, and other mechanisms. The approach thus maintains that we believe choices are
causally determined mechanisms in order to explain that we believe choices are not causally
determined. Though perhaps scientifically plausible, this would be an obviously unreasonable
inference.
This discussion is admittedly quick, but I hope it is enough to highlight the problems that the
Spinozan strategy faces.5 In what follows, I explore several alternatives to the Spinozan strategy that
uses the failures of the Spinozan strategy as a jumping off point. Although the Spinozan strategy
closely focuses on how we do not experience choices, it has surprisingly little to say about how we do
experience choices. In light of the difficulties faced by the Spinozan strategy, I propose here to
explore a collection of alternative approaches that take the phenomenology of choice as a starting
point, which I collectively call ‘reasons-based approaches’ (RBAs). In the deliberative context
normally associated with making choices, it seems that we often lack an experience of choice as
caused at all, deterministic or otherwise—that is, mental states in the context of practical deliberation are often not presented as causally efficacious. Rather, experience tends to represent the
contents of mental states in the deliberative context as reasons that favor choosing a particular way.
This marks an important difference between choices and other cases, where the objects of
experience may be presented as candidate recipients of causal force. RBAs try to harness this
insight in order to explain the widespread belief that choice is indeterministic without overgeneralizing.
Unlike the Spinozan strategy, RBAs do not rely on (1), the claim that experience does not present
one’s behavior as causally necessitated, as a premise in an inference that concludes with the belief
that choices are indeterministic. Instead, the fact that (1) is a widespread feature of first-person
agentive phenomenology is merely an enabling condition for inferring that choice is indeterministic, according to RBA. Additionally, RBAs exploit the fact that first-person agentive phenomenology presents choices as rational in light of the reasons for which they are performed.
The difference between RBAs and the Spinozan strategy can be seen more clearly by focusing on
where they identify the source of the mistaken belief. The Spinozan strategy suggests that the belief
that choices are not causally necessitated results from a hasty generalization: from the fact that we do
not experience the proximal influences on choices as causally necessitating, we mistakenly (and too
hastily) infer that none of the proximal influences on choices are causally necessitating. In contrast,
RBAs suggest a different kind of mistake: in virtue of the fact that we experience a choice as not
rationally necessitated by our reasons, we conclude that the choice cannot be causally necessitated.6
While RBAs differ from the Spinozan strategy, they share many guiding principles. RBAs agree
with the Spinozan strategy that (1) but not (2) is a feature of the first-person agentive phenomenology of choice, and that this fact is important for explaining the widespread belief in indeterministic choice. RBAs also agree with the Spinozan strategy that, as much as possible, an
explanation of the widespread belief in indeterministic choice ought to avoid overgeneralization,
it ought to rely on an inference that is prima facie plausible, and it ought to be plausible in light of
our best science.
5

For greater details on the shortcomings of the Spinozan strategy, see Kissel (2018).
The particular nature of the inference from rational relations to causal relations will vary, depending on the form of the RBA.
It might be argued that RBAs are better understood as examples of the Spinozan strategy with additional machinery bolted
on. In light of the differences marked in this paragraph, I think it better to view RBAs as a distinct approach, but I also
acknowledge the similarities. Ultimately, I think it is a matter of terminology whether RBAs are a sophisticated subset of the
Spinozan strategy or an entirely distinct approach. Thank you to an anonymous reader for pressing this point.
6
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2. Choosing on the basis of reasons
The purpose of the following section is to motivate the following commonsense claim: in the context
of practical deliberation, we tend to experience, explain, and think about our choices in terms of the
reasons that make them rational. According to the traditional Anscombian picture, when we ask the
question “Why are you doing that?” we are asking the agent to produce the reasons that rationalize
their action (Anscombe 1958, 11). As such, people often (though not always) explain actions in ways
that make the action appear rational on the basis of one’s reasons (even if we never actually choose
and perform complex actions on the basis of rational reflection). On the classic example, when
someone asks “Why did Teresa open the fridge?”, the answer cites reasons for acting, often in the
form of a belief-desire pair: 1) because she desired a beer and 2) because she believed there was beer
in the fridge.7 The core idea here is that we often explain actions, both our own as well as the actions
of others, by appealing to prior mental states of the agent; more specifically, we attribute mental
states that would rationalize the agent’s action.
According to this traditional characterization, folk explanatory practices often invoke reasons in
the form of prior mental states that rationalize an action. Reasons in this context are not merely facts
or mental states that count in favor of performing an action from the perspective of a well-informed
observer. Rather, they are motivating reasons: reasons that count in favor of performing an action in
the eyes of the agent (Smith 1994, 95). Thus, when I explain my own action in terms of reasons, I cite
the mental states that I take myself to have consciously considered and in virtue of which I acted.
Likewise, when we explain Teresa’s behavior in terms of her reasons for acting, we often (though not
always) think that Teresa in some way consciously considered her desire for a beer and her belief
that there was beer in the fridge, and these considerations motivated and rationalized her opening
the fridge.8
Why would we explain our actions and the actions of others in terms of the reasons that
rationalize those actions? For one, at least in the context of practical deliberation, we tend to think
about our available options in terms of the reasons that would rationalize them. Choices in the
context of practical deliberation are the kinds of things that are made on the basis of reasons; we
judge what we should or should not do by considering the contents of our mental states. It is a
further question, however, whether we think about choices as caused by those very mental states. To
be clear, citing prior mental states as influences on behavior does not always involve appeal to
reasons. Prior mental states can explain actions merely by causing them, as when a hypnotized
individual is caused to act in otherwise strange and irrational ways. Thus, the influence of prior
mental states qua rationalization contrasts with influence qua causation. Furthermore, reasonsbased explanations are not the only way we explain our choices and the choices of others. In
addition to reasons and mere causal explanations, we often explain behavior in terms of longstanding character traits (Teresa has always loved beer), in terms of a causal history of reasons
(Teresa comes from a family of beer drinkers), in terms of enabling factors available in the
environment (all the beer is in the fridge), etc. Nevertheless, in the context of practical deliberation,
we think about and explain the influence of our reasons primarily in terms of the degree to which
they make our choices rational.
In addition to explaining and thinking about choices resulting from practical deliberation in
terms of the reasons that rationalize them, reasons also play an important phenomenological role
in the context of practical deliberation. We often feel the “weight” of reasons, when choosing
between competing options. In the context of practical deliberation, we rarely feel the weight of

7

Davidson (1963) popularized accounts of this general form, though he did not clearly endorse the reflective element.
Many philosophers draw a further distinction between motivating and explanatory reasons (Hieronymi 2011). While this
distinction is important, I think it will not affect the present discussion, since the motivating reasons I focus on are also
explanatory reasons, so for simplicity I will restrict myself to the normative/motivating distinction. From here on, I will use the
term ‘reasons’ to refer to motivating reasons, unless otherwise specified.
8
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reasons pulling toward one uniquely rational and required option. Put another way, we feel that
our deliberations are guided by ends, or goals, that place constraints on which available options
are deemed viable, but within these constraints, there is often more than one option that, if
pursued, would bring about one’s ends (Bratman, 2009). Because numerous options would bring
about these ends, it often appears that there is no rational requirement to prefer one means of
bringing about that end rather than some other means. When there is no means that is uniquely
preferable given one’s ends, we might say that one’s ends do not rationally compel a unique course
of action.
We might develop an example from Anscombe to illustrate the phenomenology here. Suppose
you have committed to eating wholesome food. In front of you are a variety dishes that, if eaten,
would satisfy your commitment to eating wholesome food. You must choose which dish to eat. This
involves reflection on the various reasons in favor of choosing each dish. Perhaps Dish A is packed
with protein that promotes muscle growth. Perhaps Dish B contains a variety of unique vitamins.
Perhaps Dish C is packed with easily useable energy. Which particular dish you choose remains
open, while the end at which your choice aims remains fixed: to eat wholesome food. In this case,
there is no rational requirement that uniquely picks out one of dishes A–C. Nevertheless, after some
deliberation, suppose you pick a dish (perhaps Dish A).
Now consider the same case but focus on the phenomenology of the decision-making process. It
appears that, given your commitments and the reasons available to you, Dishes A–C are all
reasonable choices. In light of your commitment to eat wholesome food, your reasons do not
present any of the means available to you as uniquely necessary means for attaining the end of eating
wholesome food. Thus, when you choose on the basis of your reasons in this case, your reasons do
not rationally compel your choice. This lack of rational necessitation is often expressed in the firstperson agentive phenomenology of choosing. You don’t experience the weight of reasons pulling
you overwhelmingly toward one dish over another.
The above description of the phenomenology draws on a long philosophical tradition of
describing the rational influence of one’s reasons in causal terms. Hobbes describes deliberation
as a set of scales that lean one way, then the next, when engaging in practical deliberation (1841,
326). It is common to speak of rational pressure and the weight of reasons. Although the descriptions
involve causal terms, they do not necessarily pick out causal relations between reasons and choices.
Rather, they describe the feeling that some options are more rational than others given one’s
reasons. This supports the larger point that our experience tends to present choices as made on the
basis of reasons but remains largely silent when it comes to the causal relations, or lack thereof, that
obtain between reasons and choices.
The fact that you can pass over one option and move on to another during the process of
deliberation also contributes to the experience of a lack of rational necessitation. Were your reasons
to rationally compel you to select one unique option, the process of deliberation itself would end. As
such, both the process of reflecting on one’s reasons as well as the reasons themselves (understood as
counting in favor of performing an action in the eyes of the agent) contribute to the experience of a
lack of rational necessitation.
It is important to clarify that I am relying here on folk platitudes regarding practical deliberation,
and not providing a philosophy of action per se. Historically, philosophers have had a tendency to
exaggerate the degree to which rational reflection guides actions. Indeed, the classic philosophical
description of humanity is as the “rational animal.” This exaggeration bleeds over into philosophical
assumptions about folk psychology, where humans are often described as proceeding through life
constantly weighing options, considering potential outcomes, and choosing so as to maximize their
own goals.9 The thinking is that what makes humans agents is their ability to act on the basis of

9
Prominent examples of the kind of view I have in mind are attributable to Aristotle, Mill, Locke, Kant, and the “reflectivist”
positions criticized in Doris (2015).
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reflection upon consciously considered reasons. It sometimes looks difficult to square this traditional picture of humans as consciously reflective, rational agents with recent psychological work.
Confabulation studies, priming studies, automatisms, and many other experimental paradigms in
the cognitive sciences have been used to suggest that a good many of our sophisticated actions
proceed without the aid of conscious reflection upon reasons (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Bargh,
Chen, and Burrows 1996; Wegner 2003; Doris 2015).
For present purposes, I remain officially neutral on the metaphysics of reasons and choices in the
hopes of bypassing disputes in philosophy and psychology about what it is for an agent to act. It is
one question to ask whether the reflective picture of human agency can do the philosophical work it
is forwarded to do. It is quite another question to ask whether the reflective picture of human agency
resembles how “we,” (“we” the nonphilosopher folk and “we” the philosophers not sitting in the
metaphysics room gripped by theory), generally tend to think about our own action production
(Stich and Nichols 2003; Lewis 1973). It is this latter question that is of primary interest for present
purposes. According to RBAs, people regularly think about and experience their own choices as
being made on the basis of reasons, even if this does not accurately track how choices are actually
made. RBAs try to leverage the former fact into an explanation of the widespread belief indeterministic choice.

3. Constructing RBAs
In the previous section, I argued that there is a tendency to experience, think about, and explain,
choices resulting from practical deliberation in terms of rationalization by reasons and not in causal
terms. At this point, one might think that RBAs already have sufficient resources to begin
constructing an explanation of the widespread belief in indeterministic choice. The explanation
could go as follows:
(RBA1) There is a tendency among the folk to experience reasons as prior mental states that
rationalize a given choice. This tendency precludes experiencing those reasons as causes of a
given choice. In which case, in the context of practical deliberation, where people tend to
view choices as made solely on the basis of reasons, people tend to believe that choices
resulting from practical deliberation are not caused by those reasons, and so are not caused
by anything.
RBA1 suggests that the belief in indeterministic choice results largely from a kind of category
mistake. We experience choices as made and influenced by reasons, qua rationalizers, and not
caused. Put another way, we experience the relationship between our reasons and the act of
choosing as one of rationalization rather than one of causal influence. In virtue of this fact, we
mistakenly think that the act of choosing in question is not the kind of thing that is a candidate for
causal force in the first place. Choices are the kinds of things to be logically justified, not causally
necessitated. And since choices are not the right sorts of things to be caused at all, they are not the
kinds of things that can be causally necessitated. We might as well ask whether 1 þ 1 causally
necessitates 2! Or so the story goes.
RBA1 faces a version of the overgeneralization worry. According to RBA1, it is because reasons
are viewed as standing in a rationalizing relation to the outcome of our choices that it precludes
viewing those reasons as causes of our actions. But similarly, theoretic reasons stand in a
rationalizing relation to the beliefs that result from theoretical deliberation. Given this similarity,
it would seem RBA1 would predict a similar preclusion of causal relations in the case of theoretical
deliberation. And yet, there does not appear to be widespread belief in the claim that beliefs are
formed indeterministically. In fact, there seems to be general consensus that one cannot choose what
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one believes. In some sense, one must believe that which they take themselves to have the most
reason to believe.10
Admittedly, there are many differences between practical and theoretical deliberation that one
might try to appeal to in order to avoid overgeneralization here. For one, practical deliberation
concludes in a choice (or on some accounts, an intention) while theoretical deliberation concludes
in the formation of a belief. By the lights of RBA1, however, it is entirely unclear why these sorts of
difference would matter for the purposes of forming beliefs about indeterminism. Provided that
reasons are interpreted as influencing beliefs by rationalizing them in the theoretic case, it is hard to
see why RBA1 would not predict, contrary to fact, that there would be widespread belief in the
indeterminacy of theoretic belief formation. Thus, RBA1 may not meet the requirements of No
Overgeneralization.
More worrisome for RBA1, it is hard to see why the mere fact that experience presents reasons as
rationalizing one’s choice should preclude the possibility of causal relations between reasons and
choices. Indeed, though experience in many cases does not present reasons as causally influencing
choices, there is empirical support to suggest that the folk concept of practical reason includes a
causal component (Malle 1999; Malle, Knobe, and Nelson 2007). Even if reasons are not experienced
as causal influencers, people seem to think that, at least sometimes, reasons do causally influence
some choices. It just doesn’t look scientifically plausible that choices are widely viewed as existing
independently of the larger causal order.
We can look for additional resources by starting where RBA1 faltered. People tend to experience
their reasons as merely rationalizing their choices, but they also tend to conceive of reasons as being
causally efficacious; they believe that reasons are rationalizing causes. This suggests that people see
reasons as playing a dual role in practical deliberation: rationalizing and causing. Perhaps the belief
that choice is indeterministic could result from conflating the role of reasons as rationalizers
presented in experience with the background assumption that reasons are causally efficacious. As a
result, the more one feels rationally compelled to choose a certain way, the more one is inclined to
judge that they feel causally compelled to choose a certain way.
To flesh out this possibility, return once again to the phenomenology of choosing between dishes
with the end in mind of eating more healthy food. When we reflectively attend to the decisionmaking process, we find that the phenomenology often (though not always) includes the following
feature:
A. Experience presents one’s choice as not necessitated by reasons.
The phenomenology of choice presents various options as rationally consistent with one’s prior
commitments. Put another way, in view of your goals, any of the options appear open to you. This
is just a way of describing the fact that Dishes A–C each appear rationally viable given your
commitments.11
The experience of rational necessitation (and lack thereof) comes in degrees. Sometimes, when
one’s reasons seem to overwhelmingly favor one option over the other, we feel rational pressure to
choose that option. That is, were I to fail to choose this option, I would be doing something highly
irrational (Consider Martin Luther who says, “Here I stand, I can do no other.”)12 Contrasting the

10

This is a common response to the implausibility of Pascal’s wager. We can’t choose whether to believe in God.
See Sripada (2016) for discussion of this phenomenology. There may be worries, à la Sartre’s example of Pierre not being in
the café, how experience could ever represent a negation (Sartre 1956). While the story about how such negation is possible may
be tricky, I take it as fairly uncontentious that there is a difference between the lack of an experience of Pierre being in the café
and an experience of the lack of Pierre being in the café, and that both experiences are possible.
12
These observations may help explain experiences of degrees of freedom. To the extent that I experience rational (though
not rationally necessitating) pressure to choose a particular way, I will interpret my choice as less free than a choice where I
11
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experience of rational pressure felt in these cases can help isolate the feeling found in many other
cases, where one feels that one’s choices are not necessitated by reasons.
The degree to which one’s choices feel necessitated by reasons depends not only on the options
that appear available at the time, but also the goals and ends one hopes to satisfy by way of that act of
choice. If the goal is to eat more wholesome food, then perhaps dishes A–C will all appear equally
viable options. But when the more specified goal of eating tasty food is considered, then the available
options may be reduced, leading to a greater experience of rational necessitation.
Is it ever the case that we feel truly, 100 percent rationally necessitated when engaging in an act of
choice? I suspect not. This is due to the fact that, as humans, we have a great capacity for introducing
new and alternative goals that complicate the picture (Sripada 2016). Decisions are rarely made with
respect to a single end or goal; rather, they are made within the context of numerous goal frames
(Baars 1993). Given that the “goal posts” can shift, so to speak, it rarely looks like there is one unique,
rationally necessary course of action one must choose. But this observation only reinforces the point
that, in some cases, reflective attention on the first-person agentive phenomenology of choice
presents the choice as not rationally necessitated.
According to (A), the experience of choosing often presents your actions as not necessitated by
your reasons. Additionally, people tend to conceive of reasons as causes of their actions. So, it might
seem appealing to judge that since reasons did not necessitate your choice and reasons are causes
that causes did not necessitate your choice. This line of reasoning could lead one to conflate
(A) above with the subtly different following feature:
B. Experience presents one’s behavior as not necessitated by causes.
Since reasons influence choices both rationally and causally, the conflation of (A) with (B) is
surprisingly simple given prior intuitive commitments. It involves conflating the influence of the
contents of a mental state in virtue of which a choice is more or less rational with the causally
efficacious mental state in which those contents are embedded.
While this approach may sound attractive, working out the details of the proposal raises
numerous obstacles. We can formulate the present proposal more formally as follows:
(RBA2)
1. Experience presents my choice as not necessitated by reasons.
2. Reasons are causes.
3. Therefore, experience presents my choice as not necessitated by causes.
4. Therefore, choices are not necessitated by causes.
(1) is supported by reflection on the first-person agentive phenomenology of choice. (2) is
supported by the fact that people tend to conceive of reasons in the context of practical deliberation
as rationalizing causes. However, in order for (3) to seem reasonable on the basis of (1) and (2), we
must interpret (2) as an identity claim to the effect that all and only reasons are causes. This identity
claim is clearly false; there are innumerable kinds of causes that are not reasons. RBA2 seems to fail
the adequacy condition of Reasonableness on the grounds that (2) is obviously false.
Perhaps RBA2 can be rehabilitated. In the prior context of practical deliberation, and only in this
context, it is conceivable that people constrain their consideration of the causal influences on
choices to those prior mental states that also rationalize behavior. In which case, premise (2) might
appear acceptable given the context. In which case, one’s reasons are the only considered influences

experience less rational pressure. Importantly, however, both choices would still be seen as free, since neither is experienced as
rationally necessitated. Thank you to an anonymous reader for pressing me on these kinds of cases.
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on choice, causal or otherwise. In the context of practical deliberation, then, premise (2) appears
reasonable, since causal influences other than consciously considered reasons are ruled out by the
context.13
The rehabilitated form of RBA2 suggests that in the context of practical deliberation, people tend
to view causes as all and only reasons. One upshot of this strategy is that outside of the context of
practical deliberation, we should not expect people to accept (2). As a result, we should expect a
decreased belief that choices are not causally necessitated for choices made outside the context of
practical deliberation. At least at first glance, this prediction does not appear unreasonable. Suppose
Ashley, unlike Teresa, is a known alcoholic. We explain her choice to grab a beer from the fridge by
appealing to her longstanding alcoholism rather than any process of practical deliberation. Since
her behavior is not the product of practical deliberation, we do not accept (2), and so we accept that
there are causal influences beyond the reasons that rationalize her choice to grab a beer. As a
consequence, we are less likely to judge that Ashley’s choice to grab a beer from the fridge was not
causally determined. This seems to fit with common sense views about addiction. The choice to
drink is no longer in their hands.
The above proposed revision to RBA2 holds that (2) is only accepted in the context of practical
deliberation. Even with this restriction, however, the inference fails Reasonableness on other
grounds. Specifically, RBA2 relies on a fallacy of equivocation. The term ‘necessitated’ picks out
rational necessity in the first premise, but causal necessity in the third premise. Believing that
reasons are causes is not the same as believing that the rational influence of reasons is identical to
the causal influence of reasons. So, even if (2) is acceptable, the inference fails to be reasonable.14
As a final worry for RBA2, it looks like it will suffer from a problem akin to the overgeneralization
problem, which we can call the Symmetry Problem. Since (2) posits an identity between reasons and
causes, inferences from reasons to causes should go both directions. RBA2 holds that we infer that
choices are not necessitated by causes on the basis that we experience choices as not necessitated by
reasons. But if (2) is accepted in the context of practical deliberation, it would also suggest that if we
experience choices as necessitated by reasons, we would infer that the choice is causally necessitated
and vice versa. But generally, it does not appear that if we think something is causally necessitated,
we think that it is rationally necessitated as well. So, RBA2 seems to make implausible empirical
predictions.
I have raised here substantial obstacles for pursuing a fleshed-out version of the RBA. However,
we can take lessons from the failures of previous hypotheses in order to direct ourselves toward
more promising future hypotheses. RBA1 faces overgeneralization worries and is not sensitive to
apparently widespread beliefs about the causal efficacy of reasons. RBA2 fails largely due to
problems with (2), the claim that reasons are identical to causes. Rather than thinking that people
equate reasons with causes, then, we might weaken the claim such that people tend to take rational
influence as evidence for causal influence. We experience the rational influence of reasons when we
engage in practical deliberation. We can feel it exerting rational pressure. Despite this rational
pressure, cases of akrasia and plain old stubbornness suggest that, in the majority of cases, this
rational pressure does not secure an action. If this felt lack of rational compulsion were taken as
evidence that the choice similarly lacked causal compulsion, then perhaps we could explain the
widespread belief in indeterministic choice while avoiding overgeneralization. However, further
exploration of this possibility must be left for another day.

13

This suggestion need not require a standing assumption of introspective access to all of the causal influences on choices.
Rather, invoking a reasons-based explanation restricts the explanatory candidates to reasons such that the further question of
whether a given choice is causally necessitated is also restricted to this class of reasons. It is within this prior explanatory context
that the degree of rational necessitation is then conflated with causal necessitation.
14
There are further worries about the scientific plausibility of the inference generally, as well as the restricted form of (2).
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4. RBAs contrasted with other non-Spinozan views
At first blush, there are apparent similarities between the reasons-based explanations I am exploring
here and what is sometimes call the transcendence vision of decision-making (Knobe 2014). On the
transcendence view, explanations in terms of reasons are not explanations in terms of causes.
Rather, they are explanations in terms of an agent that transcends the causal talk of the scientific
image. On this transcendence vision, “… an agent can do something for a reason when the resulting
action was freely chosen and not caused by anything at all” (Knobe 2014, 78). On the transcendence
vision, it is a fundamental commitment of folk psychology that human agents are viewed in this
transcendent way and not as components of a scientific causal model.
The transcendence view and RBAs appear similar in that they both argue that the belief that
choices are sometimes not causally necessitated depends closely on folk views about how reasons
influence choices. However, the transcendence vision includes the additional folk commitment that
agents are in some sense “distinct from” or “beyond” the normal causal order. Thus, the transcendence vision requires a prior commitment to folk dualism in order to explain why people believe
choices are not causally necessitated. On the transcendence vision, reasons do not causally
necessitate choices because agents make choices, and agents are not subject to causal influence in
the same way as other entities.
RBAs do not require the prior assumption that agents are inherently distinct from the larger
causal order. Although people sometimes infer that they are not causally necessitated, this need not
entail that the agent making the choice is in some sense “over and above” the normal causal order.
This is a benefit of RBAs, as the evidence on widespread commitment to the requisite kind of
dualism needed to get the transcendence vision of the ground at this point is mixed (Mele 2014, 195;
Lindeman, Riekki, and Svedholm-Häkkinen 2015). Although recent studies do suggest that
commitment to dualism correlates with belief in free will, the correlation does not distinguish
between incompatibilist and compatibilist free will beliefs (Murray, Murray, and Nadelhoffer 2021;
Wisniewski, Deutschländer, and Haynes 2019). In which case, even if belief in dualism is widespread, it does not obviously explain the apparently widespread belief that choices are not causally
necessitated. Furthermore, RBAs have the additional benefit that they can accommodate the folk
viewing reasons as occasional causal influences on choices, as seen in RBA2.
RBAs also share some similarities with Terry Horgan’s views on the role of phenomenology in
the formation of free will beliefs (Horgan 2011a, 2011b). Horgan presents a rich and complex
account of how much of the phenomenology of first-person agency can be interpreted as having
satisfaction conditions that are consistent with a deterministic universe. For present purposes,
however, we can focus on his account of so-called “recalcitrant data”; that is, his account of
widespread beliefs and judgments made on the basis of phenomenology, and the truth of which
is NOT consistent with a deterministic universe. The apparent widespread belief that choices are
not causally necessitated is a recalcitrant datum.
Horgan offers two resources for explaining away the widespread belief that choices are not
causally necessitated. The first resource is the fact that, according to Horgan, we cannot experience
bodily motion as simultaneously causally necessitated (i.e., state-caused) as well as “up-to-us”
(i.e., actional). He writes
[A]gentive phenomenology and the phenomenology of state-causation are mutually exclusionary… . it is virtually impossible to simultaneously experience a single item of one’s own
behavior both as actional and as state-caused. And it is easy to make the mistake of inferring,
on the basis of the fact that one cannot experience one’s own behavior both as action and as
state-caused motion, that no item of behavior can really be both a genuine action and a statecaused bodily motion. (2011b, 20)
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Horgan thinks that experiencing a choice as an action precludes the possibility of experiencing it
as a state-caused motion.15 It is unclear, however, how the mere fact that we cannot experience
bodily motion as both actional as well as state-caused explains beliefs about the metaphysics of
choice. If we do infer the belief that an event is not state-caused from a lack of an experience of statecausation, then we would expect this inference to arise in domains outside of human action. It
wouldn’t matter if I necessarily lack an experience of state-caused motion, as opposed to merely
lacking an experience of state-caused motion. So, what is important for Horgan’s purposes is that I
believe that my choices necessarily lack an experience of state-causation. Stronger, I must believe
that I necessarily lack an experience of state-causation because of some fact about the way I actually
make choices. It would be very surprising indeed if there were a widespread belief that choices are
necessarily experienced as not causally necessitated.
Putting this worry to one side, it is Horgan’s second resource that looks similar to the RBA, as it
also relies on contextual parameters that restrict explanatory candidates. According to Horgan, the
concept of “agency” itself is subject to contextual parameters, and asking philosophical question
about freedom pushes these contextual parameters toward libertarian interpretations. He writes
[I]n contexts of philosophical inquiry about the compatibility of the presentational content of
agentive phenomenology with determinism … the very posing of such philosophical questions tends to drive the contextually variable implicit parameters governing the judgmental
notion of agency to a maximally strict setting—an unusual setting in which the freedom
dimension of agency is understood as incompatible with determinism, and in which the selfas-source dimension of agency is understood as a matter of metaphysical-libertarian agent
causation, as distinct from state-causation. (2011b, 20)
Horgan’s proposal is similar to RBAs in that both depend on limiting contextual parameters to
avoid overgeneralization. However, the similarities end here. On Horgan’s view, it is the posing of
explicitly philosophical questions about free will that explain interpretations of the phenomenology
such that it is libertarian friendly. On Horgan’s view, when we ask if the content of an experience of
choosing could be veridical if determinism is true, we prime an agent-causal interpretation of the
phenomenology; we push the “contextually variable implicit parameters” to the agent-causal
interpretation. So, while we normally think of freedom in compatibilist terms, posing explicitly
philosophical questions primes an incompatibilist interpretation of freedom. Although it is unclear
how the details work, Horgan thinks this primed interpretation leads us to interpret first-person
agentive phenomenology as presenting choice as not causally necessitated.
On Horgan’s view, the contextually variable implicit parameters in concepts like ‘freedom’ and
‘agency’ lead us to believe that we experience our choices as not causally necessitated. In contrast,
RBAs rely on the context of practical deliberation to prime reasons, as opposed to causal,
interpretations of experiences of choice. In doing so, RBAs avoid some of the worries facing
Horgan’s view.
The biggest concern for Horgan’s view is that the belief that choice is not causally necessitated
seems to be the default view among people, independently and prior to philosophical inquiry. Why
would first-year undergrads who have no familiarity with agent-causal libertarian or compatibilist
views of free will be subject to implicit parameter shifts prior to entering a philosophy classroom? As
an additional worry, it is not at all clear how the step from “agent-causal interpretation” to “not
causally necessitated” is supposed to work. While the belief that choices are not causally necessitated
is fairly widespread, the belief that choices are agent-caused is a relatively niche view among
philosophers. If Horgan’s story is correct, we should expect widespread belief in agent causation.

15

Magill (1997) argues a similar line.
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If undergraduate difficulties with the concept of “agent causation” is any guide, it seems unlikely
that belief in agent causation is very widespread.

5. Conclusion
The positions I have explored here fit into a long tradition of nonlibertarian explanations of the
apparently widespread belief that choices are not causally necessitated. While differing from the
Spinozan strategy in many respects, RBAs share the assumption that we do not experience our
choices as causally necessitated, before inferring both that our choices are not causally necessitated,
but also that we experience our choices as not causally necessitated. RBAs also share the commitment to providing a reasonable and scientifically plausible explanation of the beliefs that avoids
overgeneralizations. And like Spinozan strategies, RBAs have yet to provide a compelling account
that is explanatory while meeting all three constraints.
RBAs differ from the Spinozan strategy in that they take the lack of experience of causal
necessitation as an enabling condition, which must be supplemented by experiences of reasons
as rationalizing one’s choice in order to explain the belief that choice is indeterministic. By way of
closing, it is important to acknowledge one other major flaw that RBAs share with the Spinozan
Strategy. While RBAs seek to explain the widespread belief that choices are not causally determined,
and even the belief that we experience choices as not causally determined, they fail to explain much
of the other beliefs surrounding free choices. They do not explain why we might experience choices
as “up-to-us,” or why we might experience that “we could have done otherwise.” While there is a
great deal of work to be done to face the obstacles presented for RBAs earlier in this paper, I am
optimistic that they can be met, and that RBAs can be extended to these other experiences.
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